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INTRODUCTION 
In a series of cases starting with Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 the Court has held that the 
Sixth Amendment2 requires that any fact that increases the minimum or maximum sentence that 
a judge can impose on an offender3 be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless the 
fact is a prior conviction, an element of the offense for which the offender was convicted, or a 
fact admitted by the offender.4 A common factor in all of these cases is that they involved 
determinate sentencing systems. This means that the offender, once sentenced, would serve his 
entire sentence, no more, no less.5 The Court has yet to deal directly with how the Apprendi line 
of cases applies in an indeterminate sentencing system.6 In an indeterminate system, a judge 
imposes two sentences on an offender, with the shorter sentence being the amount of time the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
2  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3  This article uses the term “offender” to refer to any defendant who has pled guilty to a crime or 
who has been found guilty of a crime after a trial. The Sixth Amendment protections from Apprendi are implicated 
only during sentencing of a defendant. Therefore, any person invoking the protections from Apprendi is an 
“offender” in the sense that he has either pled guilty or been convicted of the crime to which he is being sentenced. 
4  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 
(2013). 
5  Nancy J. King, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole 
Release, 26 FED. SENT’G REP., 287, 289 (2014) (defining a determinate sentence as a sentence in which “defendants 
receive a single sentence and serve that sentence; they are not sentenced to a range within which they might or might 
not be released depending on decisions by paroling authorities at a later time.”). Some determinate sentencing 
systems give prisoners the opportunity to get out of prison early by earning “good time credits.”  James B. Jacobs, 
Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217, 222-24 (1982) (defining the term “good time 
credits” and explaining how they work in different sentencing systems). While the Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed whether Apprendi applies to the awarding or revocation of “good time credits,” most courts and 
commentators have concluded that Apprendi does not apply. See e.g., Nicholas J. Xenakis, A Good Time with the 
Sixth Amendment: The Application of Apprendi to the denial of Good Time Credit, 47 CRIM. LAW BULL. art. 3 
(“There are several state courts and one federal court that have already addressed whether Apprendi applies to the 
denial of good time credit. None of them, however, have ruled that Apprendi does in fact apply.”); King, supra note 
5 (“Corrections officials' decisions . . . delaying release eligibility by refusing to grant or revoking good time credit . 
. . fall[s] outside of the Apprendi principle.”). However, at least one article has argued that “the due process and the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees as articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey [should] apply to some factual determinations 
related to the denial of good time credit.” See Xenakis, supra note 5. Because good time credits are generally 
awarded or revoked by correction officials, not judges, whether Apprendi should apply to good-time credits is 
outside the scope of this article. This article instead focuses on when Apprendi applies to judicial sentencing of an 
offender. 
6  Bradley R. Hall, Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines by Any Other Name: When "Indeterminate 
Structured Sentencing" Violates Blakely v. Washington, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 643, 680-81 (2009) (noting that “the 
presence or absence of a parole mechanism has never been a determinative or even relevant factor in the 
constitutional equation” of an offender’s Sixth Amendment Rights in the Court’s Apprendi line of cases).  
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offender must serve before he is eligible for parole, and the longer sentence being the maximum 
amount of time he could serve before he must be released.7  
 This article argues, using the Michigan indeterminate sentencing system as a case study, 
that Apprendi should apply to the determination of the range of sentences that a judge can 
impose that an offender must serve before being considered for parole in an indeterminate 
sentencing system.8 The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Alleyne v. United States has 
undermined the Michigan Supreme Court’s reasoning for holding that Michigan’s indeterminate 
sentencing system is constitutional.9 Alleyne clarified that the proper inquiry in Sixth 
Amendment cases is whether a fact found aggravates the legally prescribed range of punishment 
available for a judge to impose on an offender.10 Since factfinding that increases the range of 
sentences within which an offender must serve in prison aggravates the legally prescribed 
punishment for his crime, the reasoning of Apprendi should apply. 
 Additionally, Alleyne renders unconstitutional judicial factfinding that increases the 
minimum sentence that the offender must serve before being considered for parole.11 Similar to 
the determinate sentencing systems involved in the Apprendi line of cases, an indeterminate 
system has only one minimum sentence.12 As such, when judicial factfinding increases the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, or Just Plain Cruel?, 
16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 89-90 (1990) (“Under an indeterminate sentencing system, the 
trial judge applies a minimum and a maximum sentence range to the convicted defendant's prison term. Any time 
after the completion of the minimum term, the prisoner becomes eligible for parole; however, he must be released 
from prison upon the expiration of the maximum term.”). This article will sometimes refer to this lower sentence in 
an indeterminate system as an offender’s “mandatory sentence.” This sentence is “mandatory” in the sense that an 
offender must serve that much time in prison before being released. Id. 
8  See infra Part IV. 
9  See infra Subsection IV.B.1. 
10  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2161-62 (2013); see infra Subsection IV.B.1. 
11  See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
12  See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
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minimum sentence a judge can impose that an offender must serve in prison in an indeterminate 
sentencing system, it is raising the statutory minimum in violation of Alleyne.13 
 Part I of this article defines the language of sentencing and the distinct concepts of 
judicial sentencing and parole availability. Part II explores the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence before Alleyne beginning with Apprendi. The Court in these cases only dealt 
directly with determinate sentencing systems, leaving open the question of how these principles 
would apply in an indeterminate system. Part III describes the Michigan sentencing system, and 
why constitutional challenges to that system failed prior to the Court’s decision in Alleyne. Part 
IV discusses the Court’s decision in Alleyne, and argues that it renders Michigan’s current 
indeterminate sentencing system unconstitutional. Part V of this article summarizes its contents 
and briefly explores what implications its conclusions would have on indeterminate sentencing 
systems in other states.  
I. THE LANGUAGE OF SENTENCING 
 A major issue that plagues court opinions and scholarly works in this area of the law is 
the lack of clarity in the use of particular sentencing terms.14 There are two important and 
distinct concepts that are used in state and federal sentencing systems and court opinions on 
these systems: judicial sentencing and parole availability.15 The confusion arises because the 
phrase “determinate,” and its antonym “indeterminate” can refer to either concept depending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
14  W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the 
Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 906 (2009) (defining the “commonly used (and commonly 
confused) sentencing terms ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate.’”); Jon Wool, Beyond Blakely: Implications of the 
Booker Decision for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 285, 286-87 (2005) (defining the sentencing 
terms and describing the confusion in the case law concerning the definitions of “determinate” and “indeterminate” 
sentences). 
15  See supra note 14. 
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upon the context and who is using it.16 Thus it is vital to clarify the definitions of the terms to 
avoid conflating these two concepts.  
A. Judicial Sentencing  
The first important concept, which the Court has discussed extensively in its Apprendi 
line of cases, is judicial sentencing of an offender and the amount of discretion the judge has in 
imposing a sentence.17 There are two basic systems that a state can enact for allowing judges to 
determine the sentence of an offender.18 The first is a system in which the statutory scheme 
allows the judge to sentence an offender to any length of time within the range proscribed for the 
crime.19 For example, a statute might permit a judge to sentence an offender convicted of armed 
robbery to any sentence between five and ten years. The judge has complete discretion to 
determine where within this range to sentence an offender. This article will refer to such a 
system, sometimes referred to as an “indeterminate” system,20 as a “discretionary judicial 
sentencing system,” or a “discretionary system.”21 This system is discretionary because the judge 
has complete discretion to sentence an offender within the range prescribed by statute for the 
crime, possibly subject to advisory guidelines that the court is not bound to follow.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  See supra note 14. 
17  Ball, supra note 14. 
18   Ball, supra note 14, at 906-07; Wool, supra note 14. There are also some instances in which a 
judge has absolutely no discretion and must sentence an offender to a specific term in prison. This is the case in 
Michigan for the maximum sentence that an offender could serve if not released early on parole. See MCL § 
769.8(1). For that sentence, a judge has absolutely no discretion and must sentence the offender to the term of years 
enumerated by statute for that crime. Id.; People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 161 (2006) (an offender’s “maximum 
sentence is not determined by the trial court, but rather is set by law.”). 
19  Ball, supra note 14; Wool, supra note 14. 
20  Ball, supra note 14, at 907 (noting that “the Supreme Court has often conflated [the two concepts], 
using “indeterminate” to mean “advisory” and “determinate” to mean “binding.”); Wool, supra note 14, at 286 
(noting that in Blakely, the Court used the phrase “indeterminate sentencing” to “refer[] to systems . . . where judges 
are free to sentence anywhere within the statutory limits.”). 
21  This is similar terminology to that employed by Professor W. David Ball in his article on this 
topic. See Ball, supra note 14, at 907. 
22  Ball, supra note 14; Wool, supra note 14. Of course, a judge does not have the discretion to 
impose a sentence outside of the statutory range for the crime. Some sentencing systems permit a judge to impose a 
sentence outside of the statutory range in some circumstances. However, a judge does not have the complete 
5	  
	  
 On the other hand, there are other sentencing systems that limit a judge’s sentencing 
discretion based upon additional facts found about that particular offender, either by the judge or 
the jury.23 For example, such a system will set the general sentencing range for an offender 
convicted of larceny at one to five years. However, if the judge or jury finds that the particular 
offender being sentenced committed larceny with a firearm, then the range within which the 
judge must sentence that offender shifts from one to five years to three to five years, or from one 
to five year to one to seven years. 24 Once the factfinder finds that the offender committed 
larceny with a firearm, the judge’s binding sentencing range is altered, and he must sentence the 
offender to a sentence within that new range.25 This article will refer to such a system, frequently 
referred to as a “determinate sentencing system,” as a “binding judicial sentencing range” or a 
“binding system.” Such a system is binding because facts found by the judge or jury alter the 
range within which a judge must sentence the offender.26 
 
 
B. Parole Availability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discretion to do so, as “departure” is generally limited to unique circumstances, and is unavailable in most cases. See 
infra note 64.  
23  Ball, supra note 14, at 907; Wool, supra note 14. 
24 Prior to Alleyne, the Court had distinguished between judicial factfinding that increased the 
minimum sentence a judge can impose on an offender and judicial factfinding that increased the maximum sentence a 
judge can impose on an offender, finding the former to be constitutional and the latter to be unconstitutional. See 
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557-68 (2002). However, in Alleyne the Court rejected that distinction and 
held that increasing the minimum sentence a judge can impose on an offender is also subject to Apprendi. Alleyne v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 (2013). 
25  When a sentencing range is shifted from one to five years to three to five years, a judge’s 
sentencing discretion is limited, as the minimum sentence he must impose on an offender is three years. On the other 
hand, when the sentencing range is shifted from one to five years to one to seven years, the judge has greater 
discretion to impose a sentence, as he may now impose a sentence up to seven years in jail. Regardless of whether a 
judge has more or less discretion, both increasing the floor and the ceiling of the judicial sentencing range 
“aggravate” an offender’s punishment because both alter the legally prescribed range of sentences a judge can 
impose to the detriment of the offender. See infra Section IV.B. 
26  Ball, supra note 14, at 907; Wool, supra note 14. Some binding sentencing systems allow a judge 
to depart from the guidelines in unique circumstances. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
ability for a judge to depart from the guidelines if certain additional requirements are met does not immune a 
sentencing system from scrutiny under Apprendi. See infra note 64. 
6	  
	  
 The second important concept in sentencing is whether an offender can obtain early 
release on parole.27 A majority of states offer an offender the opportunity to obtain release prior 
to serving his entire term of imprisonment.28 In these states, an offender receives two sentences, 
the first sentence constituting the amount of time he must serve in prison before being considered 
for parole, and the second constituting the amount of time he could serve if his parole request is 
not granted.29 For example, an offender may be sentenced to five to ten years in prison; five 
years being the amount of time the offender must serve before he may be considered for parole, 
and ten years being the longest amount of time the offender could serve in prison if not released 
early on parole. This article will refer to such a system as an “indeterminate sentencing system” 
or “indeterminate system.”30 
 On the other hand, some states (and the federal system), do not offer offenders a chance 
to obtain early release by applying to a parole board.31 In such a system, the offender must serve 
the entire sentence that the judge imposes upon him, nothing more, nothing less.32 If a judge 
sentences an offender to seven years in prison, he will serve exactly seven years in prison. This 
article will refer to such a system as a “determinate sentencing system” or a “determinate 
system.”  
C. The Interaction Between The Two 
Judicial sentencing involves the range of sentences available for a judge to choose from 
when sentencing an offender, while parole availability involves whether an offender may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Ball, supra note 14; Wool, supra note 14, at 286 
28  King, supra note 5. 
29  Mason, supra note 7. 
30  This is similar terminology to that employed by Professor W. David Ball in his article on this 
topic. See Ball, supra note 14, at 906-07. 
31  King, supra note 5. 
32  King, supra note 5. Some determinate sentencing systems will grant prisoners early release if they 
earn “good time credits.” For a discussion on whether Apprendi applies to the awarding and revocation of “good 
time credits,” see supra note 5. 
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released early on parole prior to serving his total possible sentence.33 While distinct, these two 
concepts interact in an indeterminate sentencing system.34 Once a state decides that it is going to 
adopt an indeterminate system, it must decide how to determine how long an offender must serve 
in prison before he may be considered for parole and how long he could serve if denied parole.35 
Similar to sentencing in a determinate system, a state enacting an indeterminate system may 
enact a binding or discretionary system for determining the amount of time an offender must and 
could serve in prison. Thus, an indeterminate sentencing system may give the judge complete 
discretion to choose the sentences an offender must and could serve (a discretionary 
indeterminate sentencing system), or it could limit the judge’s discretion based upon additional 
fact finding (a binding indeterminate sentencing system). 
II. PRE-ALLEYNE AND INDETERMINATE SENTENCING 
These two distinct concepts, judicial sentencing and parole availability, create separate 
considerations when determining how the Sixth Amendment should be applied.36 The Court in 
its Apprendi line has dealt extensively with the concept of judicial sentencing, ultimately 
concluding that in a binding determine sentencing system, any fact that increases the minimum 
or maximum sentence to which a judge may sentence an offender must be found by a jury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  See supra note 14. 
34 For example, in Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing system, a judge has no discretion to set the 
amount of time an offender could serve if he is not released early in parole. See e.g., MCL § 769.8(1); People v. 
Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 161 (2006) (an offender’s “maximum sentence is not determined by the trial court, but 
rather is set by law.”). However, a Michigan judge does have the discretion, within a binding sentencing range, to 
impose the sentence an offender must serve before being considered for parole. See MCL § 769.8(1); MCL § 
769.34(2)(b). 
35 See supra note 34. 
36 Wool, supra note 14 (“It is critical to distinguish between these definitions because indeterminate 
systems under the Court's definition— that is, systems that impose no constraint on a judge's sentencing discretion—
are not affected by the Blakely rule, whereas indeterminate systems under the second definition may well be.”). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.37 However, the Supreme Court has not squarely dealt with whether 
any fact that increases the sentence an offender must serve before being considered for parole in 
an indeterminate system must also be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 38 Thus, this 
still remains an open question for the Court to consider in future cases. 
A. The Apprendi Line 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “other than the fact of prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 39 In Apprendi, the offender pled 
guilty to one count of “possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,” for which the judge 
must sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment between five and ten years.40 At 
sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence “that the crime was motivated by 
racial bias,” increasing the range of sentences within which the judge must imprison the offender 
to ten to twenty years in prison.41 The Court ultimately concluded that increasing the maximum 
sentence that the judge could impose upon the offender based upon judicial factfinding violated 
the offender’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment42 rights to a jury trial.43  
Two years later, the Court held that a judge could find facts that increased the minimum 
sentence the judge could impose on an offender.44 In Harris v. United States, the offender was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 
(2013). 
38 Hall, supra note 6; Wool, supra note 14, at 287. 
39  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
40  Id. at 468-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995); § 2C:43-6(a)(2)). 
41  Id. at 470-71 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)). 
42  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
43  See id. at 491-97. 
44  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002). 
9	  
	  
found guilty of selling illegal narcotics while in possession of a weapon.45 The statutory 
minimum sentence that the judge could impose was five years imprisonment.46 However, the 
sentencing judge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the offender had “brandished” the firearm, increasing the minimum sentence the 
judge could impose to seven years in prison.47 A majority of the Court ultimately concluded that 
this did not violate the offender’s Sixth Amendment rights.48 
The plurality opinion distinguished this case, in which the mandatory minimum sentence 
a judge could impose was increased by judicial factfinding, from Apprendi, in which the 
mandatory maximum sentence a judge could impose was increased by judicial factfinding, and 
concluded that the former did not violate the Sixth Amendment.49 It reasoned that, unlike 
increasing the maximum sentence an offender could receive, increasing the mandatory minimum 
sentence a judge can impose on an offender does not “extend the offender’s sentence beyond that 
authorized by the jury’s verdict.”50 Instead, once a jury finds the offender guilty, it has “already 
found all the facts necessary to authorize the Government to impose the sentence.”51 Since the 
jury has authorized a sentence anywhere within that statutory range, an offender’s Sixth 
Amendment rights are not violated.52 Justice Breyer, while admitting that he could “not easily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Id. at 550 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). 
46  Id.  
47  Id. at 550-51. 
48  Id. at 568. 
49  Id. at 557-68.  
50  Id. at 557. 
51  Id. at 565. 
52  Id. at 557. The plurality also noted that Apprendi did not limit the judge’s ability to exercise his 
broad discretion to sentence an offender within the statutory range. Id. at 560. Since “the judge may impose the 
minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from” a jury, 
it makes no difference constitutionally that the state requires that judge to do sentence the offender to a lengthier 
sentence within that range. Id. at 565. Therefore, since increasing the minimum sentence to which a judge can 
sentence the offender does not “swell the penalty above what the law has provided for the acts charged,” it is 
distinguishable from increasing the maximum sentence a judge can impose and therefore does not violate the 
offender’s Sixth Amendment Rights. Id. at 562 (citing Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 85, at 54). 
10	  
	  
distinguish Apprendi from this case in terms of logic,” nevertheless concurred in the Court’s 
judgment based upon his belief that Apprendi had been wrongly decided.53  
In Blakely v. Washington, the Court expanded on the doctrine announced in Apprendi.54 
In Blakely, the offender pled guilty to kidnapping his wife, a class B felony.55 While the 
maximum sentence for a class B felony in Washington was ten years, for the specific facts to 
which the offender pled guilty, Washington law provided a sentencing range of 49 to 53 
months.56 Nevertheless, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender 
committed the act with “deliberate cruelty,” and based upon this finding sentenced the offender 
to 90 months in prison.57 Washington law allowed judges who found that an offender in a 
domestic violence case committed the crime with deliberate cruelty to enhance the offender’s 
sentence beyond the general statutory range.58 The Court held that the judge’s sentence violated 
the offender’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.59  
The Court determined that the relevant statutory maximum in this case for Apprendi 
purposes was not the ten year maximum sentence for class B felonies, but the 53 month 
maximum for the offender’s crime.60 The Court held that the statutory maximum for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment is not the maximum possible sentence a judge could statutorily impose on 
an offender who committed that particular crime, but rather is “the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  Id. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
54  542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (“This cases requires us to apply the rule we expressed in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey . . . .”). 
55  Id. at 298-99. 
56  Id. at 299. 
57  Id. at 300. 
58  Id.  
59  Id. at 314 
60  Id. at 303-04. 
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offender.”61 Since the maximum possible sentence the judge could impose on that offender 
without making any additional findings of fact was 53 months, that was the relevant statutory 
maximum, and any finding that increased the offender’s sentence above 53 months must be 
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.62 
In two subsequent cases, the Court applied the framework annunciated in Apprendi and 
expanded in Blakely to strike down sentencing systems in which judges found facts that 
increased the maximum sentence an offender could receive for his crime.63 In United States v. 
Booker, the Court struck down the federal sentencing guidelines, which imposed a binding 
judicial sentencing range based upon judicial factfinding that was constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the Washington system struck down in Blakely.64 Similarly, in 
Cunningham v. California, the Court held that California’s Determinate Sentencing law (DSL), 
which allowed a judge to increase an offender’s sentence above the sentence authorized by the 
jury’s verdict based upon a judicial finding of “aggravating factors,” also violated the offender’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). 
62  Id. at 304-05. 
63  See infra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
64  543 U.S. 220, 233 (“As the dissenting opinions in Blakely recognized, there is no distinction of 
constitutional significant between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in that 
case.”) The federal sentencing system allowed a judge to depart from the binding sentencing range if he or she found 
“that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
from that described.” Id. at 234. The Court held that this did not immunize the federal sentencing guidelines from an 
Apprendi problem, explaining that:  
Importantly . . . departures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most. In 
most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into 
account, and no departure will be legally permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to 
impose a sentence within the Guidelines range. It was for this reason that we rejected a similar 
argument in Blakely, holding that although the Washington statute allowed the judge to impose a 
sentence outside the sentencing range for “‘substantial and compelling reasons,’” that exception 
was not available for Blakely himself. 
Id. at 234 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004)). 
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Sixth Amendment rights.65 These two cases reaffirmed the Court’s holdings in Apprendi and 
Blakely. 
In sum, the Court’s pre-Alleyne jurisprudence repeatedly held that, in a determinate 
binding judicial sentencing system, any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence that a 
judge can impose on an offender must be found by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.66 The Court further clarified that the “statutory maximum” for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment is the maximum sentence that the judge may impose on the particular offender 
based solely upon the jury’s verdict or his guilty plea.67 On the other hand, the Court held that 
this restriction did not apply to the statutory minimum sentence that a judge can impose on an 
offender.68 In other words, if a statute stated that an offender convicted of a particular crime must 
receive a sentence between five and ten years in prison, any additional fact that increased the 
maximum sentence a judge could impose beyond ten years must be found by a jury. On the other 
hand, any fact that increased the minimum sentence a judge could impose above five years, with 
the maximum staying the same, did not need to be found by a jury.  
All of these cases involved judicial sentencing.69 Specifically, they all involved binding 
judicial sentencing systems.70 The Court repeatedly stated in its cases that a discretionary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  549 U.S. 270, 277, 293 (2007). California’s sentencing system proscribed three possible terms of 
imprisonment for a crime, “a lower, middle, and upper term sentence.” Id. at 277. The judge was forced by statute to 
sentence the offender to the middle term unless it found “circumstances in aggravation or mitigation” that justified 
the lower and upper sentence. Id. The Court held that for Apprendi purposes, the middle sentence constitutes the 
statutory maximum because the “aggravating circumstances [necessary to sentence an offender to the upper term] 
depend on facts found discretely and solely by the judge.” Id. at 288. Therefore, the Court held that allowing the 
judge to find an aggravating factor that was not part of the jury’s verdict or the offender’s plea to increase the 
offender’s sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 288-89, 293. 
66  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
67  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
68  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002). 
69  See Hall, supra note 6, at 675 (“In sum, the Supreme Court's constitutional sentencing cases 
establish that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated when the sentencing judge ‘impose[s] a sentence 
greater than the maximum he could have imposed under state law without the challenged factual finding.’”). 
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sentencing system does not violate the Sixth Amendment, as judges historically have had broad 
discretion to sentence an offender within the range proscribed by statute.71 Furthermore, in none 
of these cases did the Court address the issue of parole availability.72 Thus, it still remains to be 
seen what effect, if any, the availability of parole has on an offender’s Sixth Amendment rights 
under Apprendi.  
B. Justice Scalia’s Dictum  
 While the Court’s holdings have not yet addressed the issue of parole eligibility, there 
was discussion around the edges that provided some insight into the views of the Justices on this 
issue.73 Particularly, Justice Scalia included language in his concurring opinion in Apprendi and 
the majority opinion in Blakely that would seem to argue against applying Apprendi to an 
indeterminate sentencing system.74 Justice Scalia’s arguments were not binding authority, as they 
constituted dictum in Blakely,75 and were part of a concurring opinion in Apprendi that was not 
joined by a majority of the Court.76 Nevertheless, following Blakely, it provided persuasive 
authority that lower courts could draw from when determining the constitutionality of judicial 
sentencing in an indeterminate sentencing system. 
 In Apprendi, Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court77 and wrote a separate two-
page concurrence in response to Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.78 Justice Scalia’s reasoning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  See Hall, supra note 6, at 675 (concluding that the Court has held that any sentencing system that 
allows a judge to impose a harsher sentence based upon judicial factfinding must be advisory). 
71  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a 
judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory range.”) (citing Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000)). 
72  Hall, supra note 6. 
73  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 309 (2004). 
74  Id. 
75  See infra text accompanying note 84. 
76  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
77  See id. at 468. 
78  See id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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indicates that he believes that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the lesser sentence in 
indeterminate sentencing systems.79 In response to Justice Breyer’s assertions that a system in 
which a judge finds facts that affect an offender’s sentence is the only fair way to determine 
sentences, Justice Scalia argued: 
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated 
crime he is exposing himself to a prison sentence of 30 years-and that if, upon 
conviction, he gets anything less than that he may thank the mercy of a 
tenderhearted judge (just as he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted parole 
commission if he is let out inordinately early, or the mercy of a tenderhearted 
governor if his sentence is commuted). . . . the criminal will never get more 
punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, and his guilt of the 
crime (and hence the length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will be 
determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow 
citizens.80 
 
 This is strikingly similar to the language Justice Scalia used two years later in his 
majority opinion in Blakely v. Washington.81 In Blakely, Justice Scalia, in response to Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent, explained why an indeterminate sentencing system does not implicate the 
Sixth Amendment.82 Justice Scalia argued: 
Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like 
a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the 
exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the 
offender has a legal right to a lesser sentence—and that makes all the difference 
insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. 
In a system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every 
burglar knows he is risking 40 years in prison. In a system that punishes burglary 
with a 10–year sentence, with another 30 added for use of a gun, the burglar who 
enters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than a 10–year sentence—and by 
reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be 
found by a jury.83 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 498 (emphasis in original). 
81  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004). 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
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This language was clearly dictum, as the Court did not base its opinion upon whether the 
Washington sentencing system was determinate or indeterminate.84 Nevertheless, it provides 
persuasive authority for the Court’s view on the subject. 
 Justice Scalia’s dicta provide two main arguments against applying Apprendi to the 
sentence an offender must serve before being considered for parole in an indeterminate 
sentencing system. First, he argues that an offender has no legal right to a sentence less than the 
maximum sentence authorized by the jury, and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not apply to 
factfinding that results in a sentence that is less than or equal to that maximum.85 This position is 
supported by the Court’s opinion in Harris that a judge may find facts that increase the 
mandatory minimum sentence a judge can impose on an offender.86 If an offender has no Sixth 
Amendment right to a sentence below the maximum sentence authorized by a jury’s verdict, then 
factfinding that increases the amount of time the offender must serve would not be subject to 
Apprendi because the jury’s sentence authorizes any sentence up to the maximum the offender 
could serve for that crime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  In fact, that Court never even stated in its opinion whether Washington’s system was 
indeterminate or not. Id. at 298-331. “Obiter dictum” (dictum for short) is “[a] judicial comment made while 
delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential 
(although it may be considered persuasive).” Obiter Dictum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), available 
at Westlaw BLACKS. Since the Court did not even mention whether Washington’s system was determinate or 
indeterminate when making its decision, it clearly could not have been necessary for their decision and therefore 
Justice Scalia’s statements on indeterminate sentencing is dictum. 
85  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon 
that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a prison sentence of 30 years . . . the criminal 
will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime.”) (emphasis in original); Blakely, 542 
U.S. at 309 (“Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may 
implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not 
pertain to whether the offender has a legal right to a lesser sentence—and that makes all the difference insofar as 
judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.”) (emphasis in original). 
86  See supra text and accompanying notes 50-52. 
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 Secondly, Justice Scalia argues that in an indeterminate system an offender has no 
reasonable expectation of receiving a sentence below the statutory maximum for that crime.87  
When an offender commits a crime, he knows that he is risking a sentence up to the statutory 
maximum.88 Thus, since “the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for 
when he did the crime,” the Sixth Amendment does not apply.89  
 The Michigan Supreme Court relied heavily on Justice Scalia’s arguments when it upheld 
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing system from a constitutional challenge after Blakely.90 
However, this persuasive authority that indicated that Apprendi does not apply in an 
indeterminate system has been undermined by binding authority from the Court’s 2013 decision 
in Alleyne v. United States.91 Thus, courts will need to reconsider Apprendi’s application to 
indeterminate sentencing systems post-Alleyne.  
III. CHALLENGES TO MICHIGAN’S SENTENCING SYSTEM PRE-ALLEYNE 
Michigan has an indeterminate sentencing system in which the judge has discretion, 
within a binding sentencing range, to impose the sentence that an offender must serve before 
being considered for parole.92 The binding sentencing range within which the judge must impose 
a sentence is determined by judicial factfinding.93 The Michigan Supreme Court in People v. 
Drohan held that Apprendi does not apply to the maximum sentence a judge can impose that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“the criminal will never get more punishment 
than he bargained for when he did the crime.”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309 (“In a system that says the judge may 
punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in prison.”).  
88  See supra note 87.  
89  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
90  See infra text and accompanying notes 134-139, 143-146, 161-164, 172-180. 
91  See infra Sections IV.A-B. 
92  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (hereinafter “MCL”) § 769.8(1); MCL § 769.34(2)(b). 
93  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 142-43 (2006) (stating that Michigan’s sentencing system 
“allows a trial court to set an offender’s minimum sentence on the basis of factors determined by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”). 
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offender must serve before being considered for parole.94 The Michigan Supreme Court based its 
decision primarily upon the assumption that the Sixth Amendment only protects an offender’s 
right to a sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict.95 Therefore, the Michigan 
Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not protect an offender’s sentence that 
he must serve before being considered for parole because the jury’s verdict authorizes a sentence 
up to the statutory maximum that the offender could serve.96 
A. Michigan’s Indeterminate Binding Sentencing System 
The Michigan sentencing system is an indeterminate system, meaning that a prisoner is 
eligible for early release on parole prior to serving his full sentence.97 Thus, an offender in 
Michigan receives two sentences, one for the length of time he must serve before being 
considered for parole, and one for the maximum amount of time he could serve if parole is not 
granted.98 The sentencing judge has no discretion in determining the maximum amount of time a 
prisoner could serve, as that sentence is fixed by statute based upon the felony class of the 
conviction.99 However, a sentencing judge does have discretion, within a particular guideline 
range, to choose the minimum sentence a prisoner must serve before he will be considered for 
parole.100 
In order to determine the proper sentencing range within which the judge must sentence 
an offender that the offender must serve in prison, the court assigns the offender a Prior Record 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  474 Mich. 140, 164 (2006). 
95  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 309 (2004); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557-68 (2002). 
96  Drohan, 475 Mich. at 162-63. 
97  See MCL § 769.8(1); Drohan, 475 Mich. at 161 (“[I]n all but a few cases, a sentence imposed in 
Michigan is an indeterminate sentence.”). 
98  Mason, supra note 7. 
99  MCL § 769.8(1); Drohan, 475 Mich. at 161 (an offender’s “maximum sentence is not determined 
by the trial court, but rather is set by law.”). 
100  MCL § 769.8(1); MCL § 769.34(2)(b). 
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Variable (PRV) score, and an Offense Variable (OV) score.101 The judge calculates an offender’s 
PRV score by examining the nature and number of the offender’s prior convictions and 
comparing them to the requirements of multiple PRVs.102 For example, a judge determines an 
offender’s PRV 1 score based upon the number of “high severity” felony convictions he has on 
his record.103 If the offender has one prior “high severity” felony conviction, the court assesses 
him 25 points; if he has two prior “high severity” felony convictions, the court assesses him 50 
points; and if he has three or more prior high severity felony convictions, the court assesses him 
75 points.104 Other Michigan PRVs that the court must score against an offender include: the 
number of prior low severity convictions (PRV 2),105 the number of prior high severity 
adjudications (PRV 3),106 and the number of prior misdemeanor convictions (PRV 5).107  
In order to determine an offender’s OV score, a judge must find, by a preponderance of 
the evidence,108 that the offender committed his crime in a particular way or that the crime 
caused a particular result.109 For example, a judge determines an offender’s OV 1 score based 
upon what kind of weapon the offender used when committing the crime and how he used it.110 
If the judge finds that “[a] weapon was displayed or implied” during the commission of the 
felony, he scores the offender five points.111 However, if the judge finds that “[a] firearm was 
discharged at or toward a human being or a victim was cut or stabbed with a knife or other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  MCL § 777.21. 
102  Id. 
103  MCL § 777.51. 
104  Id. 
105  MCL § 777.52 
106  MCL § 777.53 
107  MCL § 777.55. 
108  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 142-43 (2006) (stating that Michigan’s sentencing system 
“allows a trial court to set an offender’s minimum sentence on the basis of factors determined by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”). 
109  MCL § 777.22. 
110  MCL § 777.31. 
111  MCL § 777.31(1)(e). 
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cutting or stabbing weapon,” he scores the offender 25 points.112 Other OVs that judges find to 
determine an offender’s OV score include: whether the offense caused psychological injury to a 
member of the victim’s family (OV 5),113 the number of victims to the crime (OV 9),114 and 
whether or not “the offender was a leader in a multiple offender situation” (OV 14).115 
 Once the court has scored all the individual PRVs and OVs, those individual scores are 
added to make one total PRV score and one total OV score. The court applies these scores to the 
sentencing grid that correlates with the grade of felony for the crime.116 The court then locates 
the offender’s PRV score on the horizontal axis of the grid, and his OV score on the vertical 
axis.117 At the intersection of the offender’s OV and PRV score is the sentencing range within 
which the court must sentence the offender.118 For example, for a class A felony, a judge must 
sentence an offender with a PRV score of 30 and an OV score of 25 to a mandatory term of 
imprisonment between 81 and 135 months.119 The longest amount of time the judge can sentence 
an offender that he must serve in prison, in this example 135 months, is sometimes referred to as 
the offender’s “maximum-minimum” sentence.120 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112  MCL § 777.31(1)(a). 
113  MCL § 777.35. 
114  MCL § 777.39. 
115  MCL § 777.44. 
116  MCL § 777.21(1)(c). 
117  See e.g., MCL § 777.62 (the minimum sentencing grid for class A felonies). 
118  Id. Both axes on the grid are subdivided into smaller categories. Id. For example, for a class A 
felony, an offender with 15 PRV points is placed in the C category of PRV scores, which is the category for any 
offender with a PRV score between 10 and 24 points. Id. Additionally, an offender with an OV score of 25 points is 
placed in category II, which is the category for any offender with an OV score between 20 and 39 points. Id. These 
subcategories determine where on the x-axis and y-axis an offender’s scores are, which ultimately determines his 
minimum sentencing range. Id. 
119  MCL § 777.62; MCL § 769.34(2). “A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range 
established under the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure 
and states on the record the reasons for departure.” MCL § 769.34(3). However, as the Court explained in United 
States v. Booker, the ability of a judge to depart from the guidelines does not immunize a sentencing system from an 
Apprendi challenge. See supra note 64. Therefore, the fact that a Michigan judge may depart from the guidelines in 
certain individual circumstances is irrelevant for Apprendi purposes. See supra note 64. 
120  See People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 162, 163 (2006). 
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 In sum, the Michigan sentencing system is an indeterminate system in which the 
maximum sentence an offender could serve is fixed by statute, while the amount of time the 
offender must serve before being considered for parole is determined by the judge based upon a 
binding judicial sentencing range.121 In order to determine the proper sentencing range, the judge 
makes findings of facts to determine the offender’s OV and PRV score.122 The judge then applies 
those scores to the sentencing grid for the applicable felony class to find the range within which 
he can impose the offender’s mandatory sentence.123  
Because the United States Supreme Court has held that the fact of an offender’s prior 
convictions need not be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, judicial factfinding of an 
offender’s PRV score in Michigan does not implicate Apprendi.124 However, Michigan’s OV 
scoring system is similar to Washington’s sentencing system that was struck down in Blakely. 
The only constitutionally significant difference between the two sentencing system is that the 
Michigan sentencing system is indeterminate.125 Thus, considering the similarities, Michigan’s 
sentencing system was ripe for a legal challenge in the years following Blakely. 
B. The Challenge to Michigan’s Indeterminate Sentencing System after Blakely. 
The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing 
system after Blakely in the 2006 case People v. Drohan.126 In Drohan, the offender was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121  See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. 
122  See supra text accompanying notes 101-115. 
123  MCL § 769.34(2).  
124  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
125  See infra text accompanying notes 149-151. 
126  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140 (2006). The Michigan Supreme Court had briefly addressed the 
issue two years earlier in a footnote. See People v. Claypool, 470 Mich. 715, 730 n.14 (2004). However, this 
language was dictum, and therefore was not binding precedent. Drohan, 475 Mich. at 167 (2006) (Kelly, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Christopher M. Thompson, Redefining "Statutory Maximum": The Demise 
of Michigan's Presumptive Indeterminate Sentencing Guidelines at the Hands of Blakely v. Washington, 83 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 137, 150 (2006). 
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convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and two counts of fourth degree sexual 
conduct.127 During sentencing, the judge scored the offender ten points for OV 4 (psychological 
injury to a victim) and 15 points for OV 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim).128 This judicial 
factfinding increased the offender’s mandatory minimum sentencing range from 36 to 90 months 
in prison,129 to 51 to 127 months in prison.130 The judge ultimately sentenced the offender to a 
mandatory sentence of 127 months in prison, with 360 months serving as the fixed statutory 
maximum sentence.131 The offender challenged the sentence, arguing that the judicial factfinding 
that increased the maximum sentence that the judge could impose that he must serve before 
being considered for parole (his “maximum-minimum” sentence) violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights.132 The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately concluded that this judicial factfinding did not 
violate the offender’s Sixth Amendment rights.133  
The Michigan Supreme Court held that because Michigan’s sentencing system was an 
indeterminate system, judicial factfinding that increased an offender’s “maximum-minimum” 
sentence was not unconstitutional under Blakely.134 The Court offered three main reasons why 
increasing an offender’s “maximum-minimum” sentence based upon judicial factfinding did not 
violate his Sixth Amendment rights.135 First, the Court argued that because an offender knows 
that he could face a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum, the Sixth Amendment 
does not entitle him to a jury determination of his “maximum-minimum.”136 This argument 
echoes the “reasonable expectation” argument raised by Justice Scalia in Apprendi and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  475 Mich. 140, 144 (2006). 
128  Id. at 145. 
129  Id. at 167. 
130  Id. at 145 n.3 
131  Id. at 145. 
132  Id.  
133  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 164 (2006). 
134  Id. at 159-65 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 163. 
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Blakely.137 The Court reasoned that the offender in this case committed his crime, “knowing that 
he was risking 30 years in prison. When [he] was, in fact, sentenced to a maximum of 30 years in 
prison, he received all the protections he was entitled to under the Sixth Amendment.”138 Thus, 
because an offender knows that he could serve up to the full statutory maximum, he is not 
entitled to a jury determination of any sentence below that.139 
Second, the Court argued that a jury need not find facts that determine the offender’s 
“maximum-minimum” sentence because an offender may not be released immediately after 
serving his mandatory sentence.140 After an offender serves his mandatory sentence, the parole 
board has the discretion to keep him in prison until he has served the entire statutory 
maximum.141 Since the offender is not entitled to release at any point prior to serving the full 
statutory maximum, a jury finding is not required to increase the sentence at which the offender 
is eligible for parole.142 
Finally, the Court reasoned that, unlike the sentences overturned in the Apprendi line of 
cases, the “maximum-minimum” sentence imposed in the Michigan sentencing system “will 
always fall within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict.”143 Since a conviction authorizes a 
sentence up to the fixed statutory maximum, any sentence below that is “derived from the jury’s 
verdict,”144 and the Sixth Amendment does not entitle an offender to a sentence below that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 309 (2004); see supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
138  Drohan, 475 Mich. at 163. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id.  
142  Id. at 163-64. 
143  Id. at 162. 
144  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 162 (2006). 
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statutory maximum.145 Therefore, judges have the discretion to sentence an offender anywhere 
below that set statutory maximum for the offender’s crime.146 
While stated a number of different ways, the Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion was 
based upon one main assumption, that the Sixth Amendment only protects an offender from an 
increase in the amount of time he could serve in prison. Since a Michigan offender could always 
serve the full statutory maximum, imposition of a lesser sentence for the time he must serve is 
not protected by the Sixth Amendment. The Court drew support for this conclusion from Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Apprendi and dictum in Blakely.147 Thus, prior to Alleyne, the 
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that Apprendi does not apply to the sentence an offender 
must serve before being considered for parole in an indeterminate system.148 
C. Two Statutory Maximums?  
 To determine the persuasiveness of the Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion, it is 
helpful to compare Michigan’s indeterminate system with the Washington determinate system 
that was invalidated in Blakely. In both systems, the range of sentences that a judge may impose 
is increased due to judicial factfinding.149 In other words, both constitute a binding judicial 
sentencing range.150 The only relevant difference between the two sentencing systems is that one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145  Id. at 163 (“In short, the Sixth Amendment ensures that an offender will not be incarcerated for a 
term longer than that authorized by the jury upon a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Sixth 
Amendment does not entitle an offender to a sentence below that statutory maximum.”) (emphasis in original) 
(citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
146  Id. 
147   See id. at 159-64. In its analysis section, the Michigan Supreme Court cites twice to Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi and once to his dictum in Blakely. See id. In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court 
cites to other United States Supreme Court decisions in its analysis section five times, twice in support of a quote 
from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi, once simply citing the holding of Blakely, and two other times citing 
the history of the Sixth Amendment. Id. These citations show how much weight the Michigan Supreme Court gave 
Justice Scalia’s views on the Sixth Amendment when determining the outcome of this case. 
148  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 164 (2006).  
149  Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299-300, with MCL § 769.34(2)(b), and MCL § 
777.21. 
150  See supra note 149. 
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is determinate and the other is indeterminate.151 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that in binding judicial sentencing system, a judge may not increase the statutory maximum 
based upon judicial fact-finding.152 Thus, the first issue is what constitutes a statutory maximum 
in an indeterminate system. 
In a determinate sentencing system, like the one in Blakely, there is only one statutory 
maximum. The statutory maximum in a determinate system is “the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
offender.”153 Since a judge in a determinate system imposes only one sentence, the sentence an 
offender will spend in prison, the maximum sentence a judge can impose based upon the jury’s 
verdict is the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes. 
However, in an indeterminate system, there are two potential statutory maximums for 
Apprendi purposes. A judge in an indeterminate system imposes two sentences, one for the 
amount of time the offender must serve in prison, and one for the amount of time the offender 
could serve in prison.154 Thus, an indeterminate system contains two “maximum sentence[s] the 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
offender,”155 the maximum sentence a judge can impose that the offender must serve, and the 
maximum sentence a judge can impose that the offender could serve if not released on parole.156  
Once we determine that there are two statutory maximums in an indeterminate system, 
the next issue is whether both statutory maximums are protected by the requirements set forth in 
Apprendi. If Apprendi applies to the maximum sentence a judge can impose that an offender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  Compare Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-300, with MCL § 769.8(1), and People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 
140, 161 (2006). 
152  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490); United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
153  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 302 (emphasis in original). 
154  Thompson, supra note 126. 
155  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 302. 
156  Mason, supra note 7; Thompson, supra note 126. 
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must serve, Michigan’s sentencing system violates the Sixth Amendment because judicial fact 
finding increases the maximum sentence the judge may impose on the offender.157 However, if 
Apprendi applies only to the maximum amount of time an offender could serve if not released on 
parole, Michigan’s sentencing system prior to Alleyne did not violate the Sixth Amendment 
because that maximum is fixed by statute and may not be increased by judicial factfinding.158 
The Michigan Supreme Court in Drohan concluded that the maximum amount of time an 
offender could spend in prison was the only statutory maximum protected by Apprendi.159 
However, it is not clear why this should be the case. In Blakely, the Court determined that the 
sentencing range for the particular offender was the statutory maximum under Apprendi, not the 
maximum the judge could impose for that crime under statute.160 Of the three main reasons 
provided by the Michigan Supreme Court for its conclusion, only one of them logically flows 
from Supreme Court precedent from the Apprendi line of cases. 
First, the Michigan Supreme Court argued that, because an offender who commits a 
crime can “expect” to receive a sentence as high as the maximum sentence he could serve under 
statute, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to his “maximum-minimum.”161 This argument 
echoes Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Apprendi and dictum in Blakely.162 However, the 
Court’s Apprendi line has never indicated that a prisoner’s “reasonable expectations” were 
relevant to the application of the Sixth Amendment. In fact, this “expectation” argument, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  Thompson, supra note 126. 
158  Thompson, supra note 126. 
159  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 164 (2006); Thompson, supra note 126, at 151 (“The Michigan 
Supreme Court has adopted one possible, reasonable definition of the term: that a ‘statutory maximum’ is simply the 
period a defendant may serve.”) (emphasis added). 
160  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004); Hall, supra note 6, at 685 (arguing that the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s definition of statutory maximum in Drohan “mirrors the argument that the Supreme 
Court rejected in Blakely.”) 
161  Drohan, 475 Mich. at 163. 
162  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 309 (2004); see supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
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accepted as convincing, could similarly be applied to undo the entire line of Apprendi 
jurisprudence. Is it not true that when the offender in Apprendi committed his crime due to racial 
bias he did so knowing that he was risking 20 years in prison? After all, New Jersey statute 
clearly stated that an offender who committed an offense that was “motivated by racial bias” 
would receive a heightened sentence.163 Nevertheless, the Court held that the offender’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated because a fact that enhanced the maximum sentence that the 
judge could impose was not found by a jury.164 Thus, the relevant issue under Apprendi is not 
whether an offender can “expect” to receive up to a particular sentence when he commits a 
crime, but rather whether a jury must find a fact that increases the maximum sentence that a 
judge can impose on an offender.  
In addition, even if an offender’s expectation is a relevant consideration in determining 
an offender’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Michigan Supreme Court’s “expectation” argument 
ignores an offender’s expectation in the possibility of parole. It is inescapable that an offender in 
the Michigan system should expect that he could spend up to the fixed statutory maximum in 
prison.165 However, it is not reasonable for an offender to “expect” that he must serve additional 
time before being considered for parole based upon judicial factfinding. By ignoring an 
offender’s “expectation” of the amount of time he must serve before being eligible for parole, the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s “expectation” argument presumes its own conclusion. For these two 
reasons, the “expectation” argument does not support the conclusion that the maximum sentence 
a judge can impose that an offender must serve in prison in an indeterminate sentencing system 
should be exempt from Apprendi protections. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995); § 2C:43-6(a)(2)). 
164  Id. at 491-97. 
165  Drohan, 475 Mich. at 163. 
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Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court argued that because an offender has no 
guarantee that he will be released before he serves the fixed statutory maximum for that crime, 
the judicial determination of the amount of time the offender must serve in prison is not subject 
to Apprendi.166 In essence, the Court is saying that because the sentence a judge imposes that the 
offender must serve may not ultimately affect the total time he actually spends in prison, a judge 
may find facts that increase that range.167 However, this argument is contrary to the Court’s 
Apprendi jurisprudence, as increasing the range of sentences an offender is subject to in a 
determinate system does not “guarantee” that he will receive a greater sentence either.168 
For example, when the range of sentences that a judge may impose on an offender is 
increased from five to ten years to five to fifteen years, the judge is not obligated to sentence the 
offender to a term of imprisonment longer than the original maximum; he could still impose a 
sentence that is ten years or less.169 Even though increasing the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose in a determinate system does not “guarantee” a longer sentence for the offender, the 
Court would still find that any increase violated the offender’s Sixth Amendment rights.170 
Similarly, while increasing the time an offender must spend in prison does not “guarantee” that 
an offender will spend more time in prison than he would have without the increase, doing so 
still increases the maximum sentence that a judge could impose on an offender.171 Therefore, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166  Id. at 164. 
167  Id.  
168  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 & n.3 (2013) (“[I]f a judge were to find a fact that 
increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the 
defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range (i.e., the range applicable 
without that aggravating fact.”)) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000)). 
169  Id.  
170  Id.  
171  See King, supra note 5 (“That a paroling authority may ultimately decide not to release the 
defendant when he first becomes eligible is irrelevant. What is crucial is that the legislature has narrowed the penalty 
range available to the trial judge once the specified fact is determined.”). 
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argument does not adequately differentiate a determinate from an indeterminate system for 
Alleyne purposes. 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s final argument, however, did provide an adequate 
justification, prior to Alleyne, as to why an offender’s “maximum-minimum” should not be 
subject to Apprendi. The Court argued that a jury’s verdict authorizes any sentence for the 
offender up to the fixed statutory maximum.172 Therefore, any sentence below that fixed 
maximum is derived from the jury’s verdict.173 The Court cites to Justice Scalia’s dicta in 
Apprendi and Blakely to support its argument.174 Furthermore, while the Court did not feature 
Harris prominently when making this argument, that case also supports their position.175 In 
Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that a finding a fact that increases the minimum 
sentence a judge may impose on an offender does not need to be found by a jury.176 The Court 
reasoned that increasing the mandatory minimum sentence a judge must impose does not “extend 
the offender’s sentence beyond that authorized by the jury’s verdict”177 because the jury has 
“already found all the facts necessary to authorize the Government to impose” any sentence 
within the sentencing range.178 This is also true in Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing system. 
Once a jury finds an offender guilty, it has authorized a term of imprisonment up to the fixed 
statutory maximum.179 Thus, when the judge sets an offender’s “maximum-minimum,” it is not 
increasing the offender’s punishment from that authorized by the jury.180 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172   People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 162-63 (2006). 
173  Id.  
174  Id. at 159, 163. 
175  See id. at 159-64. 
176  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002). 
177  Id. at 557. 
178  Id. at 565. 
179  People v. Drohan, 475 Mich. 140, 161-62 (2006). 
180  Id. 
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If the Sixth Amendment is viewed as ensuring that the sentence an offender receives is 
within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict, then Drohan was correctly decided. This view 
is supported by Justice Scalia’s dicta in Apprendi and Blakely181 and the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Harris.182 Specifically, this reasoning derives from the Court’s differentiation 
between a fact that increases the minimum sentence a judge may impose, and a fact that increases 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose.183 Therefore, based upon the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Harris, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Drohan was on solid legal 
ground prior to Alleyne v. United States.  
IV. ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES AND PEOPLE V. LOCKRIDGE 
 Prior to Alleyne, Michigan’s sentencing system did not appear to tread on an individual’s 
Sixth Amendment rights. However, the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Alleyne v. 
United States, overruling its previous decision in Harris,184 effectively wiped away any 
foundation to differentiate the statutory maximum the offender must serve from the statutory 
maximum the offender could serve.185 As such, the Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Drohan is no longer on solid legal ground, and therefore should be overturned. In addition, 
Alleyne v. United States rendered raising the minimum sentence that the judge may impose on an 
offender that he must serve unconstitutional.186 As such, Michigan’s sentencing system is 
currently unconstitutional in so far as it allows the judge to find facts that increases the minimum 
and maximum sentence a judge may impose that the offender must serve in prison.187 
A. Alleyne v. United States  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 309 (2004); see supra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
182  See supra notes 49-53. 
183  See supra notes 49-53. 
184  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557-68 (2002). 
185  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2161-63 (2013). 
186  See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
187  See infra Sections IV.A-B. 
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 In Alleyne v. United States, Justice Breyer altered his position, and joined four other 
justices in overruling Harris v. United States.188 In Harris, the Court had held that a finding that 
increased the minimum sentence that a judge could impose on an offender need not be found by 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.189 The majority in Alleyne concluded that Harris was contrary 
to the Court’s holding in Apprendi, and held that “the principle applied in Apprendi applies with 
equal force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum.”190 
 The Court, citing to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Harris, stated that “[i]t is impossible 
to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime.”191 Similar to 
increasing the statutory maximum, increasing the prescribed floor for a sentence “aggravate[s] 
the punishment,”192 because it narrows the offender’s sentencing range and “‘require[s] the judge 
to impose a higher punishment than he might wish.’”193 It is irrelevant that a judge could still 
impose a sentence above the new statutory minimum without the additional finding,194 because 
raising the mandatory minimum “alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate 
it.”195 Thus, the Court overruled Harris and held that any fact that increased the maximum or 
minimum possible sentence that a judge may impose must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.196  
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 Justice Breyer, despite his continued disagreement with the Court’s holding in Apprendi, 
cast the fifth vote to overturn Harris.197 He argued that it was “highly anomalous to read 
Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing facts that permit a judge to impose a higher 
sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that require a judge to impose a 
higher sentence.”198 Since Apprendi has become well established in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
Justice Breyer concluded that the inconsistency between Harris and Apprendi should be resolved 
in Apprendi’s favor.199 
B. Why Michigan’s Sentencing System is Unconstitutional after Alleyne 
The Court’s decision in Alleyne invalidates Michigan’s sentencing system by making 
judicial factfinding that increases either the minimum or maximum sentence that a judge may 
impose that an offender must serve unconstitutional. First, Alleyne undermines the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in People v. Drohan that was based largely on the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Harris.200 With that reasoning undermined, it becomes clear that 
increasing an offender’s “maximum-minimum” in an indeterminate system implicates the Sixth 
Amendment in the same way as it does in determinate ones.201 Once this is established, it 
logically follows that increasing the minimum sentence a judge can impose that an offender must 
serve based upon judicial factfinding is also unconstitutional.202 Alternatively, even if the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Drohan on the constitutionality of an offender’s 
“maximum-minimum” continues to be the proper holding, Alleyne still renders Michigan’s 
increase of the offender’s minimum sentence based upon judicial factfinding unconstitutional.203  
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1. Why Alleyne undermines Drohan 
 Alleyne, In addition to extending Apprendi to raising the statutory minimum a judge can 
impose in a determinate sentencing system, altered the fundamental inquiry when determining an 
offender’s Sixth Amendment rights.204 Prior to Alleyne, the Court had held that only increasing 
the statutory maximum sentence a judge can impose implicated Apprendi.205 The Court reasoned 
that the Sixth Amendment ensured that an offender’s sentence would not be longer than the 
maximum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict.206 As a result, the minimum sentence a 
judge could impose on an offender could be increased based upon judicial factfinding because 
that sentence was still within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict.207 If the Sixth 
Amendment only protects an offender’s right to receive a sentence no longer than the maximum 
sentence authorized by the facts found by the jury, then the sentence that an offender must serve 
before being considered for parole in an indeterminate system would not be subject to the Sixth 
Amendment. This is true because any term of imprisonment the offender ultimately receives 
does not extend past the maximum sentence authorized by the jury.208 
 However, the Court in Alleyne rejected this view of the Sixth Amendment.209 The Court 
held that it is irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment inquiry that increasing the statutory minimum 
sentence a judge can impose does not subject an offender to a sentence higher than that 
authorized by the jury’s verdict.210 Instead, the relevant inquiry is “whether a fact is an element 
of a crime,”211 and “[w]hen a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to 
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aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted 
to the jury.”212 Since “it is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribe floor 
aggravate the punishment,” it is an element of the crime that must be found by a jury.213 Thus, 
the proper inquiry under Alleyne when determining an offender’s Sixth Amendment rights is not 
whether the sentence is authorized by the jury’s verdict, but rather whether a finding of fact 
“alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it.”214 
 Under this new framework, it is clear that increasing an offender’s “maximum-minimum” 
is unconstitutional. In the same way that increasing the “mandatory minimum” a judge may 
impose in a determine system “alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it,”215 
so does increasing the maximum sentence an offender must serve.216 Judicial factfinding 
“produce[s] a higher range”217 of sentences that an offender must serve, thereby aggravating the 
punishment.218 It is irrelevant that increasing an offender’s “mandatory minimum” may not 
actually result in a longer sentence served, in the same way that it is irrelevant in a determinate 
system that an offender’s actual sentence received when the statutory minimum is increased may 
be the same sentence he would have received without the increase.219 All that is relevant is that 
the legally prescribed range for the crime is aggravated based upon judicial factfinding.220 When 
the maximum sentence a judge can impose that an offender must serve in prison is increased, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212  Id.  
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013). 
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legally prescribed range for the crime has increased and therefore any fact that does so must be 
found by the jury. 
If increasing an offender’s “maximum-minimum” sentence based upon judicial 
factfinding is unconstitutional, it also follows logically that increasing the minimum sentence a 
judge can impose upon an offender based upon judicial factfinding is unconstitutional as well.221 
In the same way that the Court could find no logical reason to differentiate the statutory 
maximum and minimum in a determinate sentencing system, there would be no logical reason to 
differentiate the maximum and minimum sentence that a judge may impose that an offender must 
serve before being considered for parole.222 Both alter the legally prescribed range within which 
a judge must impose a sentence that the offender must serve in prison.223 Thus, Alleyne renders 
unconstitutional both increasing the minimum and maximum sentence that an offender must 
serve. 
2. One Statutory Minimum 
However, even if the Michigan Supreme Court’s conclusion in Drohan that Apprendi 
does not apply to the maximum sentence a judge can impose that an offender must serve is still 
good law, Alleyne renders raising the minimum sentence a judge can impose that an offender 
must serve based upon judicial factfinding unconstitutional. As argued above, there are two 
potential statutory maximums in an indeterminate sentencing system, the maximum sentence a 
judge can impose that he must serve, and the maximum sentence a judge can impose that he 
could serve.224 However, in an indeterminate system, like a determinate system, there is only one 
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statutory minimum. The minimum sentence a judge can impose that an offender must serve and 
the minimum sentence a judge can impose that the offender could serve are identical. For 
example, in an indeterminate system, if the sentencing guidelines prescribe a range of 25 to 40 
months in prison, the minimum sentence that a judge can impose that the offender must serve is 
25 months, and the minimum sentence the offender could serve in prison is also 25 months. 
Thus, the offender’s minimum sentence, like that in a determinate system, is the sentence that the 
offender must serve in prison. 
Therefore, while the existence of two maximums in an indeterminate sentencing system 
arguably distinguishes it from a determinate system,225 that same distinction does not exist when 
we look at the statutory minimum. When a judge finds facts that increase the minimum sentence 
he can impose in an indeterminate system, he is increasing the amount of time an offender must 
serve in exactly that same way as a judge in a determinate sentencing does when he increases an 
offender’s mandatory minimum.226 Therefore, if it is unconstitutional for a judge in a 
determinate system to increase the mandatory minimum sentence for offender based upon 
judicial fact finding, it is also unconstitutional for a judge to do so in an indeterminate sentencing 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 After the Court’s decision in Alleyne, it is clear that Apprendi should apply to both 
sentences a judge imposes on an offender in an indeterminate sentencing system. This is because 
Apprendi overturned the Court’s decision in Harris, which provided a basis for differentiating 
indeterminate from determinate sentencing systems.227 Additionally, Alleyne altered the 
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fundamental inquiry in a Sixth Amendment sentencing case.228 The Court held in Alleyne that 
Appendi applies to facts that increase an offender’s statutory minimum sentence because those 
facts “alter[] the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it.”229 Since it is inescapable 
that increasing the range of sentences a judge can impose that constitutes an offender’s 
mandatory term of imprisonment also “aggravates” an offender’s “legally prescribed 
punishment,”230 it follows that any fact that alters that range must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 Currently sixteen states have sentencing systems that “have one or more statutory 
provisions that limit either parole or probation eligibility based on additional judicial findings at 
sentencing.”231 Should the Court officially adopt the position of this article, these sixteen states 
will need to adapt their laws accordingly. Some states, like Michigan, would have to overhaul 
their entire sentencing system, while others would only need to repeal or alter a few individual 
statutes.232 States would have a number of options to choose from if forced to alter their 
sentencing systems to comply with such a ruling, including submitting questions of fact that raise 
the offender’s sentencing range to a jury, making their sentencing guidelines advisory, or giving 
a judge total discretion to sentence an offender within the minimum and maximum set for the 
time the offender could serve in prison.233 
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 In 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider a challenge to 
Michigan’s sentencing system after Alleyne.234 However the Michigan Supreme Court rules on 
the issue, the United States Supreme Court should resolve this issue nationally to clarify this 
murky area of the law for the sixteen states that have statutory provisions that might be 
vulnerable. The United States Supreme Court should ultimately conclude that it is 
unconstitutional to increase the minimum or maximum sentence that a judge must impose on an 
offender that the offender must serve in prison before being considered for parole based upon 
judicial factfinding. Such a holding is consistent with the Court’s approach to the Sixth 
Amendment enunciated in Alleyne,235 and to the important role of the jury as a check on 
government power,236 by ensuring that the government cannot aggravate the legally proscribed 
punishment for an offender without the authorization of a jury of his peers.  
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